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(Review) Desmond Manderson, Songs Without Music: Aesthetic Dimensions of
Law and Justice
Abstract
This elegant, wide-ranging and stimulating book has everything but the music. In graphic form, even the
music is available as a frontispiece to each chapter, introduced with an extract from the score of the
music for which it is named. The work begins with a ‘Prelude’ and ‘Fugue’ (Bach) and has a ‘Requiem’
(Mozart) on the death penalty, while ‘Quartet for the End of Time’ (Messiaen) opposes modernism and the
reification of law, looking to space (in legal geography), rather than time, for the source of a ‘critical
pluralism’. Surprisingly, this apparently precious device works, and it works at a number of levels.
Analogies with the pieces of music help to illustrate the point of each chapter and the playful
counterpoint between the music and the argument is a source of, well, aesthetic pleasure. By drawing our
attention to the appreciation of formal structure shared by music and law, as in the sparse, elegant prose
of the opening ‘Prelude’, Desmond Manderson uses the format of the book to illustrate his theory.
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Desmond Manderson, Songs Without Music: Aesthetic Dimensions of Law and Justice.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000, 316 pp., £37.95 (hbk).
This elegant, wide-ranging and stimulating book has everything but the music. In graphic form,
even the music is available as a frontispiece to each chapter, introduced with an extract from
the score of the music for which it is named. The work begins with a ‘Prelude’ and ‘Fugue’
(Bach) and has a ‘Requiem’ (Mozart) on the death penalty, while ‘Quartet for the End of Time’
(Messiaen) opposes modernism and the reification of law, looking to space (in legal
geography), rather than time, for the source of a ‘critical pluralism’. Surprisingly, this
apparently precious device works, and it works at a number of levels. Analogies with the
pieces of music help to illustrate the point of each chapter and the playful counterpoint between
the music and the argument is a source of, well, aesthetic pleasure. By drawing our attention to
the appreciation of formal structure shared by music and law, as in the sparse, elegant prose of
the opening ‘Prelude’, Desmond Manderson uses the format of the book to illustrate his theory.
The book’s argument is simple and inclusive: law is based on aesthetics. This is not just seen in
the literary devices of judges or the architecture of the court or the trial, but suffuses all legal
practice and judgement. ‘Where is the aesthetic in law? The answer is, everywhere’ (p. 201). A
committed pluralist, Manderson finds an aesthetic basis for the diversity of legal regimes. This
does not simply apply to various social groups, but also explains individual interpretations:
‘law means something to me which is different from what it means to you, just as does a piece
of music or a book’ (p. 175). The radical relativism that this position could imply is tempered
by the possibility of moral persuasion that forms part of Manderson’s very social conception of
aesthetics.
This robust theory of aesthetics owes most to George Santayana: it includes symbols and
sensory force, shared culture and personal experience. His appreciation of semiotics is broad
(even transatlantic: Peirce and Kevelson as well as Goodrich and Derrida), yet he rejects the
semiotic assumption that there is ‘something else’ behind the surface: ‘There is nothing
contingent about the surface, the image: it is itself a system of meaning and a representation of
culture’ (p. 39). The important message of this work is that we can still make judgements while
concentrating on the surface. These are aesthetic judgements with practical consequences
throughout law and legal scholarship.
Manderson makes aesthetics do a lot of work. It carries the burden well, if better in some areas
than others. Methodologically, the aesthetics of law helps to explain many legal phenomena,
and becomes a valuable perspective to guide research. It can be used to interrogate historical
statutes, as in ‘Motet’, where a study of English statutes from the 13th to the 16th centuries
reveals the changing audience to whom they are addressed (from agents of the king to
subjects). In ‘Variations on a Theme’, drug laws are seen as an expression of an aesthetic
judgement of cleanliness and filth, the basis of the boundary of crime between insiders and
outsiders. Here, and in ‘Requiem’, aesthetics is at its strongest, allowing an understanding of
particular laws while offering a basis for their critique.
As a foundation for legal reasoning or justice, aesthetics is up against a long tradition of
alternatives. In theories of legal reasoning, it is not offered much opposition by the positivist
common law orthodoxy of Hart or other versions of naïve rationalism, Manderson’s favourite
target.1 However, traditions of phronesis and rhetoric from Aristotle to Gadamer offer a vision
of justice and practical moral reasoning that has much in common with Manderson’s
aesthetics. Each comprehends the diversity of ‘local knowledges’ and seeks a reason of the

heart as well as the head, which can make fair decisions, or criticize unfair laws, in an
imperfect world. This book is a useful contribution to the rehabilitation of a pre- (or post-)
Kantian conception of aesthetic reasoning which does not relegate such judgements to the
realm of taste. Its somewhat hasty move from an aesthetics of law to one of justice in the final
chapter would benefit from a broader appreciation of its place in this project.
In a book sparkling with a breadth of sources and illustrations (without pictures), the musical
and literary sources work better than those from science or its history. The celebration of chaos
theory as a metaphor for a critical pluralism is more confusing than instructive. The discussion
of the discovery of perspective in the context of 13th-century statutes would have added more
to the work on the 15th century, where Manderson’s dates show it belongs.
A book on law and aesthetics devoting more attention to music than to visual arts or literature
would in itself be a valuable corrective to previous studies. This book achieves much more by
proposing, with beautiful clarity, a way of approaching law through aesthetics which allows for
pluralism with judgement, and for reason with feeling. The musical theme reinforces the
message of the text by drawing down the visceral impact of music into legal discourse. This is
movingly illustrated by applying Mozart’s commentary on death in his ‘Requiem’ to the death
penalty which, as Manderson shows, pretends it is about anything but death. The University of
California Press missed a beat by not bringing out the CD to accompany the book.
Notes
1. Manderson does not only choose easy targets. While influenced by Derrida, he criticizes the
latter (in common with so many others) for concentration on performative law, noting that
‘legal interpretation happens in every corner of the social system’ (p. 98).
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